- Attackers moved within hours: after the November 12 Microsoft 365 outage, fake notices from senders like ”Service Health” cited held messages or a security issue, with a deadline and one button.
- Click tracking hides the destination: buttons use SendGrid or Salesforce Marketing Cloud tracking links, branded or not, hiding the target in an opaque token that visible-link checks miss.
- Template flaws are detection signals: look for an unfilled ”DOMAIN” placeholder, clumsy wording, a Microsoft-style incident ID and a random token in each subject line.
- Related lures are emerging, and we’re blocking them: a November 17 French-language lure leads through a CAPTCHA to a fake Microsoft sign-in. We block the call-to-action URLs and will update this blog.
Attackers Exploit the Microsoft 365 Outage with Fake “Held Messages” Lures
By Mimecast Threat Research and Intelligence
Key Points
Within hours of the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12, 2026, we began seeing phishing emails that use the outage as a lure. The messages pose as Microsoft service notices, with display names such as ”Service Health”, ”Mail-Restore-Auth” and ”Health Status” and subjects that begin ”Outage -” and ”Restore –”, ”Strengthen-Security”. Each pushes the recipient to click a button, and the links run through SendGrid click tracking, to hide the real destination.
What the emails look like
We have seen two themes, each shown here with a representative email. Both borrow the Microsoft logo and a service-notice tone, and both rely on urgency.
Theme 1, held messages: ”messages held after the outage.” The email as shown in Figure 1.0 claims mail flow through Exchange Online was interrupted on 12 November 2026, cites an incident ID (EX1550543), and says four messages are held and will be deleted within 24 hours unless released. The button reads ”Restore messages.”
Figure 1.0: Theme 1 example (Service Health sender): the sender claims four messages will be deleted within 24 hours.
Theme 2, security issue: ”security issue found.” This as shown in figure 2.0 one carries a ”DOMAIN Support-Desk” header, says one security issue was found on your account, and offers a ”Take action” button.
Figure 2.0: Theme 2 example (Health Status sender): a generic security-check message.
Characteristics of the phishing emails
- Randomized subject token Both subjects follow the pattern ”Outage - ” plus a random alphanumeric token (20 characters in the held-messages example, 16 in the security-issue example). This looks like a per-message identifier generated by the sending tool, and it defeats exact-match subject rules.
- Display-name impersonation. The sender display names ”Service Health” and ”Health Status”, ”Mail-Restore-Auth” are chosen to imitate Microsoft service notifications.
- Unresolved template variable. The security-issue example renders the literal string ”DOMAIN” where a tenant or company name should be. The substitution never ran, which points to a mass-sending template with a tenant-name placeholder.
- Linguistic anomalies. As shown in Figure 2.0, ”TextSecurity Check up” (a missing space and an odd compound), inconsistent capitalization of ”Account” and ”Check up”, and a footer reading ”Copyright ©, All rights reserved” with no year or owner do not match Microsoft’s notification copy.
- Urgency and a single call to action. The held-messages example sets a 24-hour deletion deadline and frames the message as an automated, do-not-reply notification. Both themes offer one button (”Restore messages”, ”Take action”), which leaves the recipient one path to follow.
- Spoofed incident identifier. The quoted ID (EX followed by digits) mimics the format of Microsoft service incident numbers.
- Resent-From header. The held-messages example carries a Resent-From header. This can indicate the message was relayed or re-sent through another mailbox.
The Call to Action URLs behind the buttons
We examined the structure of two call to action URLs tied to this activity.
URL in Service Health | URL in Health Status | |
Host | Url7489[.]newbooker.com | .ct[accountID].sendgrid.net |
Type | Branded SendGrid tracking domain | SendGrid’s default tracking domain |
Path | /ls/click | /ls/click |
Parameter | upn=u001.… (318 characters) | upn=u001.… (308 characters) |
Decoded payload | 212 bytes, random-looking | 212 bytes, random-looking |
What they share. Both use SendGrid’s standard click-tracking format, and both hide the destination in an encrypted-looking value that cannot be read from the URL. Both are plain ASCII, with no lookalike characters.
What differs. The URL in Service Health is branded on a domain the sender controls, so it shows no SendGrid account ID. The URL in Health Status uses SendGrid’s own domain and exposes the sender’s SendGrid account ID. That ID is a useful pivot for finding other messages from the same sender.
Update: A New French-Language Example
New example, French-language reconnect lure: ”Reconnectez vos services après l’incident dans la région Europe.” On November 17, five days after the outage, we identified a related lure written in French and aimed at the Europe region, as shown in Figure 3.0. It uses the display name ”Microsoft 365” with a Reply-To of ”Microsoft Services,” and tells the recipient that Outlook, Exchange Online, and SharePoint have been disconnected from their Office account. It then shows a verification code and a ”Reconnecter maintenant” button.
Figure 3.0: New example (Microsoft 365 sender): a French-language reconnect lure with a verification code and button.
This example differs from the earlier two. It is sent through Salesforce Marketing Cloud from an authenticated third-party domain (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC all pass), not through SendGrid, and its links use that platform’s click tracking, which also hides the destination behind an opaque token. Every link, including the privacy, terms, and unsubscribe links in the footer, routes through that tracking host instead of Microsoft. The plain-text version contains a stray ”365” fused to the heading (”Europe365”), and the footer repeats the Microsoft address block twice. Clicking the call to action shown in Figure 3.0 leads to a Cloudflare CAPTCHA and then to the phishing page shown in Figure 4.0, a fake Microsoft sign-in page that asks for the recipient’s email address. A CAPTCHA step like this can keep automated scanners from reaching the phishing page. We have not found infrastructure shared with the campaign above.
Figure 4.0: Phishing page reached after the CAPTCHA: a fake Microsoft sign-in page that asks for the recipient’s email address.
Conclusion
Outage-themed lures follow a predictable playbook: a trusted-sounding sender's name, a deadline, and a single button. The two themes here differ in wording but share the same hidden infrastructure: SendGrid click tracking that conceals the destination from checks that read only the visible link. The later French-language example uses a different platform, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, but applies the same idea of hiding the destination behind a tracked link, so detection should not depend on any single provider.
Their template flaws, including the unresolved ”DOMAIN” variable, inconsistent copy, and a quoted incident ID that mimics Microsoft’s format, give defenders useful signals to detect them, although the French-language example shows that polished, localized variants can have few or none, so these signals should be combined with sender, authentication, and link analysis. Mimecast is blocking the call-to-action URLs used in all these campaigns, so users who click the buttons are stopped before reaching the phishing page.
Indicators
Type | Value |
Sender display names | Service Health; Health Status, Mail-Restore-Auth |
Subject pattern | ”Outage - ” , ”Restore –”, ”Strengthen - Security” followed by a random string |
Lure text | ”Action required: (4) messages held after the outage”; ”1 security issue found on your account” |
Button text | Restore messages; Take action |
Tracking host (branded) | url7489[.]newbooker[.]com |
SendGrid account ID | 118254266 |
Incident ID quoted | EX1550543 |
Related Tags
- Email & Collaboration Security